Explosion protection continues to evolve. Not because the ATEX directive itself has undergone fundamental changes, but because design, documentation and technical reality have become significantly more digital. This is precisely what a recent overview article on the subject shows. The original article can be found here.
For companies operating in potentially explosive atmospheres, this means one thing above all else: the explosion protection document must no longer be a static, mandatory filing exercise. Anyone who plans, operates or maintains facilities today must keep digital information readily available, take cyber risks in safety-relevant systems seriously and evaluate new applications such as hydrogen in a technically sound manner.
1. ATEX guidelines: digital is now officially taken into account
Since January 2026, the EU Commission has been publishing the sixth edition of the guidelines for Directive 2014/34/EU on its official ATEX website. This is not a new directive, but an important update to the interpretation aid for manufacturers, importers, operators and market surveillance authorities.
The most relevant point here is that the associated guidelines expressly state that the EU declaration of conformity or certificate of conformity can also be provided digitally, provided that manufacturers specify an internet address or a machine-readable code through which the document can be accessed. The guidelines explicitly mention examples such as web links or QR codes.
In practice, this means that paper will not disappear automatically, but digital provision is now clearly defined. Anyone who places ATEX products on the market should therefore review their documentation processes. A QR code on packaging, accompanying documents or delivery notes only makes sense if the linked documents remain available in the long term, can be clearly assigned and can be found quickly in the event of a service call.
2. Spare parts and "simple" products remain a sensitive issue
Also important: the guidelines clarify that spare parts primarily used to maintain a finished product already on the market are not automatically covered by the ATEX Directive again. At the same time, however, the guidelines also show that this distinction cannot be applied across the board. As soon as a part is placed on the market separately as an independent product or goes beyond the function of a mere spare part, the matter becomes relevant again from a regulatory perspective.
In the case of so-called "simple" mechanical products, many of them still do not fall within the scope of the directive. However, this does not mean that they are automatically uncritical in hazardous areas. The real question remains whether or not they can be an effective ignition source in real-world use. This is precisely where overly simplistic thinking often fails in practice: "not subject to ATEX" is not the same as "always unproblematic".
3. TRBS 1115 Part 1: Cybersecurity is no longer a secondary IT issue
The current German development surrounding TRBS 1115 Part 1 ‘Cybersecurity for safety-related measurement, control and regulation equipment’ is particularly relevant for operators. The BAuA is implementing this regulation with an amendment in the Joint Ministerial Gazette of 15 January 2026.
This is more than just a formal note. In modern plants, safety-related functions are often linked to networked sensors, control systems, evaluation units and communication channels. If these very systems are manipulated, incorrectly parameterised or technically compromised, explosion protection quickly becomes worthless on paper. That is why cyber security now belongs in the risk assessment and not somewhere separate in the general IT documentation.
For operators, this means that anyone who operates explosion-protected systems should not only assess ignition sources, zone classification, and device categories, but also check whether safety-related signals, shutdowns, ventilation functions, or monitoring mechanisms are vulnerable to digital attacks or poorly secured in organisational terms.
4. Hydrogen increases pressure on robust risk assessments
At the same time, hydrogen continues to gain in importance. The fact that this is not purely a theoretical topic for the future is also demonstrated by the National Alliance for Hydrogen Safety (NAWS). According to the BAM, it was set up at the beginning of 2026 with leading research institutions; the BAM is one of the founding members. The aim is to systematically strengthen the safety of hydrogen technologies along the value chain.
This is logical for explosion protection. Hydrogen has properties that make risk assessment more challenging in many applications. Anyone who works with hydrogen in the future or plans the corresponding infrastructure needs clean technical assessments, up-to-date protection concepts and reliable documentation instead of gut feelings.
What companies should do now
The need for action is quite clear:
Firstly: Check how declarations of conformity and accompanying documents are currently provided. Anyone working digitally must ensure that the information is permanently accessible and clearly referenceable.
Secondly: Check risk assessments and explosion protection documents for any digital backlogs. This also includes the question of whether safety-related measurement, control and regulation equipment has been sufficiently considered in terms of cyber security.
Thirdly: Do not be too quick to dismiss spare parts, simple operating materials and mechanical components as ‘outside the scope of ATEX’. Regulatory classification and the actual ignition hazard are two different things.
Fourthly: Do not work with old standard assumptions in hydrogen projects. New applications require robust safety concepts and technically sound assessments.
Conclusion
Explosion protection will not be reinvented in 2026. However, the requirements for practical implementation will become more stringent. Digital documentation is no longer optional, cyber risks are no longer a foreign concept in safety-related functions, and new energy sources such as hydrogen further increase the technical complexity.
Those who set this up properly now will not only have less regulatory stress, but also a more robust system in the end.
Sources and references
This article was independently formulated and its content was created on the basis of a current overview article and official primary sources.
Original source / original article: ad-hoc-news / boerse-global.de.
Primary sources: European Commission on the ATEX Guidelines 2026, BAuA on TRBS 1115 Part 1, BAM on the National Alliance for Hydrogen Safety.